| 我国行政执法不严现象的经济分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 唐绍均.我国行政执法不严现象的经济分析[J].行政法学研究,2005(3). |
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| 作者姓名： | 唐绍均 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学法学院 重庆400045讲师 |
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| 摘 要： | 行政执法不严是行政执法主体“经济人”特性的表现:边际成本小于边际收益是行政执法不严的直接动因,“寻租”是行政执法不严的外在推动力,“激励”的贫乏是执法不严的内在驱动力,自由裁量权在一定程度上为行政执法人员与行政相对人之间的非法“博弈”提供了空间。
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| 关 键 词： | 行政 执法不严 经济分析 |
Economic Analysis on Slack Administrative Enforcement of Law in China |
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| TANG Shao-jun.Economic Analysis on Slack Administrative Enforcement of Law in China[J].Administrative Law Review,2005(3). |
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| Authors: | TANG Shao-jun |
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| Abstract: | Slack administrative enforcement of law shows the characteristic of economic man of administrative body. Marginal cost less than marginal income is the direct cause. Rent seeking is the outside impulse. Lacking stimulation is its interior drive. Discretionary power provides place for illegal game between administrative law enforcement personnel and the private party. |
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| Keywords: | Administration Slack Law Enforcement Economic Analysis |
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