Border carbon adjustments, WTO-law and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities |
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Authors: | Sarah Davidson Ladly |
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Affiliation: | (1) General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, 19th Street and Constitution Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20006, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper considers unilateral border measures, as contemplated by a number of developed states in conjunction with domestic
emissions reduction schemes, as they relate to international trade and international environmental law. Specifically, I argue
that to the extent that WTO-compliance requires strict adherence to the principle of nondiscrimination, as embodied in the
national treatment and most-favored nation provisions in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, there is the potential
for conflict with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), both as a free-standing principle of
customary international law and as set out in various multilateral environmental agreements and, in particular in the climate
change context, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. This is insofar as the unilateral
imposition of BCAs by developed countries shifts costs of compliance with environmental legislation in developed economies
onto the developing world. Such allocation may conflict with the principle of CBDR, which recognizes the unequal contribution
to environmental degradation of developed countries as well as their enhanced ability to address the challenges presented
by such degradation and, as a consequence, requires that they undertake more onerous obligations with respect to climate change
mitigation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the extent to which this conflict is illustrative of a deeper tension
between efficiency and equity considerations inherent in the intersection of international economic law and international
environmental law. |
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