Taking the Rights of Parents and Children Seriously: Confronting the Welfare Principle under the Human Rights Act

This article argues that resistance to the Human Rights Acthas built up in the context of disputes relating to childrenand that such resistance is founded in the attachment of thecourts to the welfare or paramountcy principle as currentlyconceived—the principle that the child’s welfareautomatically prevails over the rights of other family members.It argues that the failure to take account of Convention argumentscould only be a legitimate stance if there was no conflict betweenthe demands of the welfare principle and those of the Conventionguarantees, but that in fact the approach of the European Courtof Human Rights differs considerably from that of the UK courtssince it seeks to balance the rights of different family members.The article goes on to argue that, taking account of the Strasbourgstance and of the already established domestic recognition ofthe presumptive equality of competing qualified Convention rights,it is time to accept the adoption of a new model of judicialreasoning in the context of disputes over children—the‘parallel analysis’ or ‘ultimate balancingact’.