The impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race

This paper examines the impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race via the computer simulation introduced in Dacey and Pendegraft (1988). We answer two basic questions. First, in an arms race are there advantages to holding elections frequently (i.e., on a short interval) as opposed to infrequently (i.e., on a long interval)? Second, do crises have an influence on the outcome of arms races, and if so, how?

The answers to these questions are straightforward. For the first question, we find that in round‐robin tournament play (i.e., traditional Axelrod‐type play) the advantage rests with the short election interval players, and in inter‐group play it rests with the long election interval players. For the second question we find that crises have a pronounced effect, and the size of the effect depends on the relationship between election frequency and the frequency with which losing players are removed from the tournament. Key Words: Election frequency, Crises, Arms Race]