| Abstract: | In the past half-decade, China has developed a careful balance of cooptative and coercive power in its attempts to dampen
the Taiwan independence movement and pursue political unification. In essence, attempts to curry favor with politically relevant
constituencies on Taiwan have been paired with attempts to diplomatically isolate and militarily threaten the island's top
policymakers. This balance is risky because of the possibility that it may appear too lenient to PRC nationalists, and too
provocative to ROC residents. Nevertheless, the current structure of carrots and sticks has emerged for three reasons. First,
the institutional coherence of Chinese decision-making and implementation has allowed for the viability of an adaptive, long-term
approach. Second, the constraints on both unreinforced cooptation and coercive diplomacy have mediated toward a posture in
which the former is enhanced and the latter downplayed. Third, expanded external opportunities in recent years have made it
possible to exploit this middle ground. |
