Overcoming strategic weakness: The Egyptian deception and the Yom Kippur War 1

Analysis of the Egyptian deception on the eve of the October 1973 (Yom Kippur) War serves to illuminate operational rationale, which may guide future strategic deception models and processes. The Egyptians used deception to neutralize two Israeli ‘strong points’ that might jeopardize the crossing of the Suez Canal: the capacity for a preemptive strike and deployment in strength in the Canal region. The deception aimed to minimize Israel's ‘early warning space’, delaying the moment of decision-making and slowing down the IDF's operational response. Implementing a dual technique of concealing and misleading, the deception lulled the Israeli early warning system, the linchpin of its security doctrine, into accepting the (wrong) alternative option. The deception gained the upper hand because it corresponded – even if unintentionally – with the fundamental perception maintained by the victim, contributing to winning the first round of the surprise attack.