| 摘 要： | This paper, from the perspective of economics and management, and mainly from the perspective of economics, conducts an exploratory research on the managerial incentive and constraining mechanisms in listed companies. This paper analyzes the population conditions of investment, financing, annual salary and stock option of the listed company in China. The paper designs the combination salary model which combines the annual salary and stock option. The listed companies of China have prodigious disfigurement in finance incentive mechanism, which is incentive deficient and constrain weak. The purpose of this paper is to design the stockholder＇s rights drive model based on combination reward contract. The results show that the listed companies in China prefer comparatively to the stock right financing and the listed companies＇ operators are not reason in investment. So it is designed the combination salary model which combines the annual salary and stock option. And it would be enlarging the liabilities financing to governing it. The paper puts forward essential factors which constitute the financial evaluation system and the measures which perfect and optimize the obvious incentive and hidden incentive, helping the listed companies to explore specific models in compensation design.
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