| Abstract: | Although Members of Congress vote on few trade bills, they participate regularly in venues such as the International Trade Commission (ITC), where important trade policy decisions are made. We assert that once removed from the voting chambers of Congress, legislators are motivated overwhelmingly by the desire to advance constituents’ trade policy interests, even those that contradict the member’s established positions on trade. Utilizing an original dataset on legislator participation in antidumping cases, we find that both Democratic and Republican members advocate protection at the ITC when they have numerous firms and constituents in their district who benefit from trade restrictions, particularly when they receive sizeable financial contributions from them. Notably, self‐proclaimed free‐traders are just as likely to seek protection for their constituents as are trade opponents. Away from Capitol Hill, then, trade policymaking exhibits few partisan and ideological influences and serves as a means for members to expand political support. Correction added on 21 August 2018, after first online publication: Abstract was added to article] |
