Continental Normativism and Its British Counterpart: How Different Are They?*

Abstract
The separability thesis claims that the concept of law can be explicated independently of morality, the normativity thesis, that it can be explicated independently of fact. Continental normativism, prominent above all in the work of Hans Kelsen, may be characterized in terms of the coupling of these theses. Like Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart is a proponent of the separability thesis. And–a leitmotiv– both theorists reject reductive legal positivism. They do not, however, reject it for the same reasons. Kelsen's reason, in a word, is the normativity thesis. Hart, however, grounds his theory in social fact. In place of the reductive thesis of the legal positivist tradition, and in sharp contrast to Kelsen's normativity thesis, Hart defends a non-reductive version of what the author terms the facticity thesis.