The Liberal Value of Privacy |
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Authors: | Boudewijn de Bruin |
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Institution: | (1) Health Policy and Management, University of Minnesota, School of Public Health, 420 Delaware Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA;(2) Workplace Accommodations RERC and Center for Advanced Communications Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 500 10th Street NE, Suite 380, Atlanta, GA 30332–0620, USA;(3) Center for Advanced Communications Policy, 500 10th Street NE, Suite 312, Atlanta, GA 30332–8845, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper presents an argument for the value of privacy that is based on a purely negative concept of freedom only. I show
that privacy invasions may decrease a person’s negative freedom as well as a person’s knowledge about the negative freedom
she possesses. I argue that not only invasions that lead to actual interference, but also invasions that lead to potential
interference (many cases of identity theft) constitute actual harm to the invadee’s liberty interests, and I critically examine
the courts’ reliance on a principle of ‘no harm, no foul’ in recent data breach cases. Using a number of insights from the
psychology of human belief, I also show that the liberal claim for protection of privacy is strengthened by the observation
that often the privacy invader cannot be held responsible for the influence on the invadee’s negative freedom. |
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