The state of nature and the evolution of political preferences

Analysis of governmental institutions often proceeds from ahypothetical 'state of nature', according to which humans areanalyzed as if they once existed as solitary individuals withno rules. Humans have never existed as humans in such an environmentbut have always been a group-living species. Rules have evolvedwith humans and were never 'created' de novo. Evolved ruleshave implications for contemporary governance. Human groupshave always been in conflict, and rules distinguish betweengroup members and outsiders. These rules have proved remarkablyflexible. Some rules regulate private conduct of group members.Although the desirability of these rules today is unclear, Iargue that a libertarian regime would have been unstable, whichmay explain why there are few persons with tastes for libertariangovernments. This analysis further explains why utility functionscontain elements of envy. Rules of property, contract, and hierarchyare well developed and universal among humans.