| Abstract: | Abstract: Certain aspects of the new Australian tax sharing arrangements are analysed against the background of West German experiences. Emphasis is laid on Federal-State relations in outlining the basic characteristics of the German machinery and the Australian arrangements. Compared to the Australian situation, the tax sharing base in West Germany is much broader and has indeed contributed to the safeguarding of State autonomy to a large extent. On the other hand, the German States have no individual power to legislate on taxes or tax surcharges. Although tax sharing is a powerful instrument in mitigating financial imbalances in a federation, it tends to conflict with the idea of a centrally controlled stabilization and distribution policy. In Germany, tax sharing is complemented by a complex coordination machinery stabilizing joint decision making of the Federal government and the States. In areas such as demand management, financial planning and allocation policies there seems to be need for such complementary arrangements, since tax sharing alone cannot achieve sufficient coordination among the different administrative levels of a federation. |
