Personality as a vocation: the political rationality of the humanities

In responding to periodic government demands that it provide a rational justification for its activities as a public utility, the humanities academy typically appeals to the absolute ethical and intellectual values of liberal education. This paper investigates the nature of this response and its relation to the governmental field. The historical, ethical and political claims involved in the appeal to liberal education are discussed and rejected. It is argue that the cultivation of personhood has neither a single (‘complete’) from nor a privileged home in the university arts faculty. Weber's sociology of ethical orders is used to frame a discussion of intellectual cultivation as a specific vocation or discipline of life. From Foucault's conception of ‘govermentality’ the paper draws an account of share of political rationality dependent of the historical deployment or particular intellectual and political technologies. The problem of the political rationality rationality of the humanities is then discussed in terms of the unplanned historical convergence of the disciplines of cultivation and the technologies of government¹.