Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation |
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Authors: | Johannes Urpelainen |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA |
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Abstract: | I propose that special interests are particularly influential in international cooperation because they are able to enact
pressure on the government already during the negotiations while the issue is not yet salient for the general public. In my
formal model, special interests can offer political support to the government in exchange for a discriminatory implementation
commitment that benefits them. The government colludes with the special interests if the value of political support exceeds
the cost. However, if the government colludes with special interests in country A, the payoff to the government and special interests in country B also decreases because the probability of successful international cooperation decreases. In equilibrium, special interests
create a collective-action problem that complicates international cooperation. In addition to providing a new explanation
for the power of special interests in international cooperation, the article illuminates how international negotiations and
domestic treaty implementation interact. The analysis also reveals a new dimension of flexibility in international cooperation. |
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