Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution

It is common in the legal academy to describe judicial decisiontrends leading to new common law rules as resulting from consciousjudicial effort. Evolutionary models of litigation, in contrast,treat common law as resulting from pressure applied by litigants.One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaininghow trends in judicial decisions favoring one litigant, andbiasing the legal standard, could occur. This article presentsa model in which an apparent bias in the legal standard canoccur in the absence of any effort toward this end on the partof judges. Trends can develop favoring the better-informed litigantwhose case is also meritorious. Although the model does notsuggest an unambiguous trend toward efficient legal rules, itdoes show how private information from litigants becomes embodiedin common law, an important part of the theory of efficientlegal rules.