| 公务员工资制度改革研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐守林.公务员工资制度改革研究[J].山东行政学院山东省经济管理干部学院学报,2009(2):47-49. |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐守林 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京师范大学,江苏,南京,210097 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于公务员工作绩效难以通过单一的测量尺度表现出来，使得在市场领域中发挥良好作用的工资机制难以完全有效地引入公务员工资收入决定机制设计中。按照委托-代理理论的分析框架，有效的公务员工资应采取固定收入加根据产出确定的浮动收入的形式，只有让公务员承担部分风险才能对公务员的行为起到激励作用。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理理论 道德风险 参与约束 激励相容约束 |
The Study of Civil Service Wage System Reform |
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| Xu Shou-lin.The Study of Civil Service Wage System Reform[J].Journal of Shandong Administrative College and Shandong Economic Management Personnel College,2009(2):47-49. |
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| Authors: | Xu Shou-lin |
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| Institution: | Nanjing Normal University;Nanjing 210097;China |
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| Abstract: | As the performance of civil servants working is hard to single out by a single measurement scale,the wage system which plays a good role in the area of the market can not be completely introduced to the civil service wage system.In this paper,according to the analytical framework of the principal-agent theory,analyze the current existing civil service system,in order to provide a unique angle for the civil service wage system reform. |
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| Keywords: | The Principal--agent Theory Moral Hazard Participation Constraint Incentive Compatibility Constraint |
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