格式条款标准化的垄断协议认定

传统的逆向选择模型将低质量格式条款的生成归因于需求端的认知缺陷;共谋模型将低质量维持原因解释为供给端的共谋,为反垄断法介入提供依据。格式条款标准化的横向垄断协议认定应满足《反垄断法》第13条规定的形式要件与效果要件,采用一般举证规则作为分析模式,由原告证明其协议、决定或协同行为形式及反竞争效果。形式要件以形式与反竞争效果的尽可能耦合为逻辑起点,应基于市场力的持久性与显著性标准加以重构。反竞争效果要件以对竞争的实质限制为标准,参照美国法实践,可通过质量或交易自由限制路径证成。

Standardization of Standard Form Contracts as Monopoly Agreements

The traditional adverse selection model attributes low quality of standard form contracts to consumers’cognitive deficiencies.Collusion model,otherwise,focuses on the reason for the maintenance of low quality,which is attributed to collusion among providers.This argument makes intervention of antitrust law possible.According to Article 13 of China Antitrust Law,standardization of standard form contracts can be recognized as monopoly agreements only if form elements and effect elements are built.Burden of proof is divided between parties with plaintiff taking the burden to prove both form of‘contract,combination or conspiracy’and anticompetitive effects.The rule of form element follows the logic thatform needs to reflect anti-competitive effects as correctly as possibleand should be reconstituted based on the durability and magnitude of market power.Anticompetitve effect element is judged by the restraint on competition which can be demonstrated through restraints on quality or transaction freedom,referring to U.S.case law.