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绩效目标异化下街头官僚的政策执行偏差及矫正
引用本文:李旭琴.绩效目标异化下街头官僚的政策执行偏差及矫正[J].桂海论丛,2009,25(2):39-43.
作者姓名:李旭琴
作者单位:福建师范大学,福建,福州,350007
摘    要:街头官僚理论是近些年公共行政学理论的一个前沿领域.处于公共政策执行末梢环节的"街头官僚"生存于公共政策执行资源稀缺和公共服务弹性需求的夹缝之中,出现绩效目标异化,表现出典型的行动逻辑--激励不足、规则依赖、选择行为、一线弃权和理性逐利,在公共利益权威分配的过程中产生偏差.矫正街头官僚政策执行偏差的主体路径包括三个方面:政策执行机构的内部改革,政策执行直接主体的自我优化,政策执行间接主体(目标团体)的问责监督.

关 键 词:绩效目标异化  街头官僚  政策执行偏差  主体路径

The Deviations of Policy Implementation by Street-level Bureaucrats under the Alienation of Performance Targets and Its Rectification
LI Xu-qin.The Deviations of Policy Implementation by Street-level Bureaucrats under the Alienation of Performance Targets and Its Rectification[J].Guihai Tribune,2009,25(2):39-43.
Authors:LI Xu-qin
Institution:Fujian Normal University Fuzhou Fujian 350007
Abstract:Street-level Bureaucrat theory is a theory fronts of public administration theory in recent years.In the public policy implementation end,"Street-level Bureaucrats"of survival in the scarcity of resources in the public policy implementation and in the elastic demand of public services,presents the alienation of performance targets and displays the typical action logic,and has the deviations in the process of the authority distribution of the public interest.The main path of rectifying the deviations of poli...
Keywords:under the alienation of performance targets  Street-level Bureaucrats  the deviations of policyi mplementation  the main path  
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