| 论物质 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱兰芝.论物质[J].理论学刊,2005,4(12):24-29. |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱兰芝 |
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| 作者单位： | 中共山东省委党校<理论学刊>编辑部,山东,济南,250021 |
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| 摘 要： | 在二元对立的哲学视阈中,物质概念是一个高度抽象了的概念,因而它不再是指称现实的物质的概念;它就像黑格尔的绝对精神一样,是一种陈旧的哲学思辨的产物。哲学的发展必然要超越这样一种陈旧的哲学思辨,而代之以新的物质观。新的物质观的要义是:物质是不能独立于人而存在的,它只能是人的视阈中的物质、马克思的实践唯物主义意义上的物质。
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| 关 键 词： | 物质概念 批判 新物质观 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-3909(2005)12-0024-06 |
On Substance |
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| Zhu Lanzhi.On Substance[J].Theory Journal,2005,4(12):24-29. |
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| Authors: | Zhu Lanzhi |
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| Abstract: | In the philosophical view of dual opposite,substance is a highly abstract concept.Therefore,it does not refer to the concept of substance in the real world any longer.Just as Hegel's absolute spirit,it is the outcome of a dated philosophical speculation.The development of philosophy will by all means go beyond it and substitute a new concept for it.The main idea of the new concept must be: Substance cannot exist independent of human beings.It can only be the substance in human vision and be that of Marxist practical materialism. |
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| Keywords: | the concept of substance animadversion the new substance concept |
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