Partisan Stacking on Legislative Committees |
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| Authors: | RONALD D HEDLUND KEVIN COOMBS NANCY MARTORANO KEITH E HAMM |
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| Institution: | 1. Northeastern University;2. Ronald D. Hedlund <3. >4. is Professor of Political Science;5. Kevin Coombs <6. is a Ph.D. candidate in political science, both at Northeastern University, 301 Meserve Hall, Boston, MA 02115.;7. University of Dayton;8. Nancy Martorano <9. is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469‐1425.;10. Rice University;11. Keith E. Hamm <12. is the Edwards Professor of American Government, Rice University, MS24, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251‐1892. |
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| Abstract: | One aspect of the partisan model for legislative committee development that is rarely studied is the degree to which the majority party seeks to control legislative committees—and, thereby, chamber decisions—via numerically “overproportional” majority party representation on standing committees. This form of “party stacking” is often mentioned in the literature but has received little systematic examination and hypothesis testing. Using data from state legislative committees for all 49 partisan legislatures in the 2003–04 and 2005–06 sessions, we found support for the partisan model: majority party stacking is associated with a slim majority party advantage in a state legislative chamber. |
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