What drives rental votes? How coalitions signals facilitate strategic coalition voting |
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| Institution: | 1. University of Mannheim, School of Social Science, Germany;2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, USA;1. Center for Research and Opinion Polls (CROP), Lomé, Togo;2. Smith College, Northampton, MA, USA;3. UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA;1. University of Antwerp, Department of Political Science, Sint-Jacobsstraat 2, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium;2. University of Luxemburg, Institute of Political Science, Maison des Sciences Humaines, Porte des Sciences 11, L-4366 Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg;1. MZES, University of Mannheim, Germany;2. Department of Political Science, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA;3. Politics, University of Manchester, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | Rental voting is a coalition voting strategy, by which supporters of a senior coalition partner cast their vote for the prospective junior coalition partner to secure its representation in parliament and, hence, the formation of this coalition. We make transparent that previous research has only studied rental-voting in contexts, in which coalition signals were consistent with the rental-vote logic. Employing a qualitative identification strategy, we find evidence for rental voting only in the context with consistent coalition signals. Moreover, respondents exposed to consistent coalition signals behave similarly to voters who most likely did not receive the inconsistent coalition signals they had been exposed to. |
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| Keywords: | Strategic voting Rental votes Coalitions Coalition signals |
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