Independent regulatory agencies in Turkey: are they really autonomous?

This article examines the autonomy of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in Turkey. It explores, first, the different factors that have led to the creation of IRAs and second, the legislative basis of their formal or de jure autonomy. Thereafter, the article assesses the extent to which this formal autonomy is really put in practice and how it is perceived by board members. The enquiry was conducted through a survey comprising interviews and a questionnaire applied to the same. It concludes that although formal autonomy is satisfactorily provided for by law, government tends to limit this autonomy through secondary legislation. Consequently, there are some constraints on the actual use of autonomy. Concerning de facto autonomy, survey findings show that boards are exposed to external and internal pressures and interference in their deliberations. Thus, the assumption that ‘the greater the autonomy the more efficient the management’ is questioned. The main sources of pressure on board members are from the regulated sectors themselves. These findings have an important bearing on democracy and the political–administrative interface, as it is confronted by market forces. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.