On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility |
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Authors: | Nicole A Vincent |
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Institution: | (1) Philosophy Department, Faculty of TBM, Delft University of Technology, PO Box 5015, 2600 GA Delft, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | Various authors debate the question of whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility. However, a plethora of
different techniques and technologies, each with their own abilities and drawbacks, lurks beneath the label “neuroscience”;
and in criminal law responsibility is not a single, unitary and generic concept, but it is rather a syndrome of at least six
different concepts. Consequently, there are at least six different responsibility questions that the criminal law asks—at
least one for each responsibility concept—and, I will suggest, a multitude of ways in which the techniques and technologies
that comprise neuroscience might help us to address those diverse questions. In a way, on my account neuroscience is relevant
to criminal responsibility in many ways, but I hesitate to state my position like this because doing so obscures two points
which I would rather highlight: one, neither neuroscience nor criminal responsibility are as unified as that; and two, the
criminal law asks many different responsibility questions and not just one generic question. |
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