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我国法院调解制度的博弈分析——再论调审分离
引用本文:张辉,张德峰.我国法院调解制度的博弈分析——再论调审分离[J].时代法学,2005,3(3):38-44.
作者姓名:张辉  张德峰
作者单位:中南大学,湖南,长沙,410083
摘    要:法院调解中双方当事人之间的讨价还价过程可以被模型化为一个不完全信息动态博弈,运用博弈理论分别考察在调审分离与调审合一两种情况下双方当事人的和解情况,可以得出调审分离更有利于提高调解的成功率的结论.此外,要提高和解的成功率,不但相关事实的查明是必要的,而且法院也不应该按同一个标准收费.

关 键 词:调审分离  博弈  调审合一  均衡
文章编号:1672-769X(2005)03-0038-07
修稿时间:2005年3月5日

The Game Analysis on Our Court Mediation System--On the Separated Mediation and Trial
Zhang Hui,Zhang Defeng.The Game Analysis on Our Court Mediation System--On the Separated Mediation and Trial[J].Presentday Law Science,2005,3(3):38-44.
Authors:Zhang Hui  Zhang Defeng
Abstract:The reconciliation procedure between both interested parties can be modeled into a dynamic game of imperfect information. By using the theory and respectively observe the reconciliation results under the combined mediation and trial and the separated mediation and trail, which shows the separated mediation and trial is advantageous to increasing the success rate of mediation. In addition, in order to increase the success ,not only ascertaining the related evidence facts but also the separated court fee is necessary.
Keywords:separated mediation and trial  game  combined mediation and trial  equilibrium
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