议会制度与公共预算的监督模式比较

本文主要致力于比较议会制度对公共预算监督模式的影响。在议会规模对预算绩效的影响方面,理性选择理论构建出了三种模式,即普遍化模式、最小获胜联盟模式和超多数联盟模式。大多数的经验研究都支持议会规模越大会带来支出扩张的假设。同时,两院制相对于一院而言更容易带来预算赤字的增长。一个强大的委员会系统,是现代议会提高预算监督能力的必要条件,而且,委员会系统的发达,并不一定会带来委员会的偏好偏离议会整体偏好的现象。

Comparison of Parliament Systems and Supervision Models of Public Budget

This review article compares how parliament systems influence supervision models of public budget. From the perspective of rational choice theory, there are three models on parliament size and public expenditure. That is the universalism or law of 1/n, the minimal winning coalitions, and supermajority coalition. Most empirical researches support that the large size of parliament stimulates a large expenditure. And the bicameralism leads to higher government deficits. A strong committee system is very essent...