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转型期地方政府与中央政府博弈关系探析
引用本文:邢孟军.转型期地方政府与中央政府博弈关系探析[J].广东行政学院学报,2004,16(5):56-58,62.
作者姓名:邢孟军
作者单位:中共中央党校 北京 100091
摘    要:随着市场经济的发展,地方政府权力逐渐增大。由于激励和问责机制的不健全、"行政区经济"的弊端及中央政府宏观调控政策乏力,一些地方对中央政府的宏观调控政策采取消极贯彻执行的对策,出现不合作博弈现象。当前,必须树立科学发展观和正确的政绩观,进一步加强中央政府权威,加大宏观调控力度,确保经济社会的全面协调发展。

关 键 词:地方政府  中央政府  博弈
文章编号:1008-4533(2004)05-0056-03
修稿时间:2004年6月12日

An Attempted Analysis on the Game Playing Relation between Local and Central Government during Transition
XING Meng-jun.An Attempted Analysis on the Game Playing Relation between Local and Central Government during Transition[J].Journal of Guangdong Institute of Public Administration,2004,16(5):56-58,62.
Authors:XING Meng-jun
Abstract:With the development of socialistic market economy, the power of local government enlarges gradually. As a result of the systemic defects of encouragement and punishment, the fault of "local administration economy" and powerless economic macro-adjustment measures of central government, it appears that some local governments' passive resistance to the central government's macro-adjustment of economy is revealing the game playing relation between local and central government. Now, we should set up the scientific outlook of development and achievement and enhance central government's macro-adjustment in order to ensure the ordinate development of economy and society.
Keywords:local government  central government  game playing  
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