| 政策执行的委托代理困境及其化解思路 |
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| 引用本文： | 肖飞飞.政策执行的委托代理困境及其化解思路[J].桂海论丛,2007,23(5):73-75. |
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| 作者姓名： | 肖飞飞 |
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| 作者单位： | 中山大学,广东,广州,510275 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于政策制定者与政策执行者的相对分开,使得政策制定权与政策执行权产生分离,导致政策执行过程中委托代理关系的形成,使政策执行极易陷入委托代理困境,从而导致政策执行失败.其主要原因是政策制定者与执行者之间存在着信息的不对称、利益的不一致和权责的不对等.通过对政策执行者的监督、激励以及对其败德行为的惩罚,可以有效地化解政策执行中的委托代理困境从而防止政策执行失败.
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| 关 键 词： | 政策执行 委托代理困境 败德行为 政策失败 |
Principal-Agent Dilemma in Policy Implementation and It's Reconciliation |
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| XIAO Fei-fei.Principal-Agent Dilemma in Policy Implementation and It''''s Reconciliation[J].Guihai Tribune,2007,23(5):73-75. |
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| Authors: | XIAO Fei-fei |
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| Institution: | XIAO Fei-fei (Zhongshan University, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510275 ) |
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| Abstract: | The comparative separation between policy-implementing and policy-making gives birth to the principal-agent relation in the process of policy implementation,easily making the implementation failed.This kind of dilemma of principal-agent is mainly due to the difference between the policy-makers and policy-implementers in fields of information resources,interests,rights and responsibility.In order to solve the dilemma of principal-agent and prevent failure of policy-implementation,it is of great necessity to establish proper system to supervise and encourage the policy-makers. |
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| Keywords: | policy implementation dilemma of principal-agent immoral action failure of policy-implementation |
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