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Public Employees as Swing Voters: Empirical Evidence on Opposition to Public Reform
Authors:Rattsø   Jørn  Sørensen  Rune J.
Affiliation:1. Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), N-7491, Trondheim, Norway
Abstract:Reform offers economic gains for society atlarge, but can represent a threat to theinterests of public employees. Publicsector reform faces opposition from votersemployed in public sector. Norwegian dataallow for an analysis this interpretation.Survey data show that public employeesprefer less reform than the rest of thepopulation. The voting behavior of publicemployees is more sensitive to reform thanis that of other voters (the swing voterhypothesis), and hence: shares of publicemployees in a local jurisdiction have anegative impact on the probability ofreform.
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