Lender Liability for Environmental Harm: An Argument Against Negligence Based Rules |
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Authors: | Eberhard Feess |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt/Main, Schumannstraße 34a, D-60325 Frankfurt, Germany |
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Abstract: | A firm strictly liable for any harm done will choose an inefficiently low care level if there is a possibility that it goes bankrupt. One possibility to improve care is extending liability to secured lenders, as applied under CERCLA and as currently being discussed in the EU. I compare strict liability, partial liability and vague negligence for lenders in a model with moral hazard and environmental auditing. While auditing is socially valuable only if it increases the firm's care level, the creditor also calculates the reduction in the information rent. Thus, for each possible care level, monitoring is always too high. This effect is aggravated by a vague negligence rule, where the probability that a lender is found liable decreases in the level of auditing. It is demonstrated that partial liability is superior, because the incentive for excessive monitoring is diminished. |
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Keywords: | lender liability limited liability effect monitoring vague negligence rule |
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