“必要而危险”的权力:民初宪政争衡中的行政专权

每个现代宪政体系都需要面对行政专权这种"必要而危险"的权力,对于新建的共和国来说,安置行政专权更是对其宪政建构的重要挑战。从民初一系列宪法及宪法草案文本来看,由于国际环境的压力,两大阵营的政治精英在应给予行政机关较大的外交自由裁量权上达成了一定共识,但对总统的赦免权力进行制约的程度不一,在紧急命令权与紧急财政处分权等问题上更是形成了尖锐对立,并最终导向了宪法秩序的瘫痪。造成这种对立的根本原因,在于1911-1912年的"大妥协"所造成的新旧势力共治结构的不稳定性。

The "Necessary and Dangerous" Power: Administrative Prerogative in Constitutional Controversies of the Early Republic of China

The arrangement of administrative prerogative is a challenging task in modern constitution-making,especially in a country that just switched from monarchy to republic.This article explores the arrangement of the "necessary and dangerous" power-administrative prerogative in the constitutional projects of various political forces.Upon close reading of and comparison between a series of constitutions and constitutional drafts,it is found that under the pressure of international environment,the two major political camps reached a certain level of consensus regarding the administrative discretionary power in foreign affairs;while their level of limit on presidential power to pardon varied but did not lead to polarization,their views on presidential power to issue emergency decrees and take emergency action in fiscal affairs seriously polarized,and finally led to the paralysis of the constitutional order.This polarization was originated in the unstable co-government of the Beiyang Clique and the revolutionary camp, a premature fruit of the "grand compromise" in 1911-1912.