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国有商业银行年薪制激励功能失灵的原因探讨
引用本文:徐灵. 国有商业银行年薪制激励功能失灵的原因探讨[J]. 学理论, 2010, 0(4): 64-66
作者姓名:徐灵
作者单位:中南大学,商学院,湖南,长沙,410083
摘    要:年薪制作为按管理要素分配的一种模式,成为了国有商业银行推崇的一种薪酬和激励制度。但在实施过程中,年薪制的激励有限与约束不足并存、外部公平性缺失与效率损失并存。本文从年薪结构设计欠科学、业绩考核指标体系不完善、监督和约束机制管理乏力、职位消费和灰色收入控制难、负责人道德风险和委托人一代理人博弈存在矛盾等方面对现行国有商业银行年薪制激励功能失灵的根源进行了探讨。

关 键 词:年薪制  激励  失灵  根源

The Cause Discussion of Encouragement Function Ineffectiveness on Yearly Salary System of State Commercial Bank
Xu Ling. The Cause Discussion of Encouragement Function Ineffectiveness on Yearly Salary System of State Commercial Bank[J]. , 2010, 0(4): 64-66
Authors:Xu Ling
Affiliation:The Business College of Central South University/a>;Changsha/a>;Hunan/a>;410083
Abstract:As a model distributed according to management factor,the yearly salary system becomes a salary and encouragement one praised highly by state commercial bank.But in the course of the implement,the yearly salary system exist some defects such as limited encouragement and insufficient binding.This essay discusses the source of encouragement function ineffectiveness from the yearly salary structure,the index system of achievements examination and the management of supervision and binding.
Keywords:Yearly Salary System  Encouragement  Ineffectiveness  Source  
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