Public choice and public policy: The vulnerability of economic advice to the interpretation of politicians

The confidence with which politicians defend their policies is in marked contrast to the qualifications which academic researchers attach to their results. The difference is indicative of a failure of the political market, whereby politicians have an incentive to select policies for electoral and ideological reasons and to minimise any uncertainty associated with policy effectiveness. In this scenario dissension between economists is of value if it alerts individuals to the sensitivity of policy answers to the framework in which they are derived. Moreover, with government failure, public choice analysts are faced with the problem of how best to amend policy advice in order to allow for potential distortion at the hands of politicians.The authors are Senior Lecturers in Economics and Members of the Centre for Fiscal Studies, University of Bath. They wish to acknowledge the very helpful comments of Professors Gordon Tullock, Harry Collins and an anonymous referee. Any errors that might remain are, of course, the sole responsibility of the authors.