从土地所有制的角度解读中国古代官僚制的经济基础——一项基于新制度经济学的分析

新制度经济学的产权理论认为,产权具有残缺性和可分割性的特征.运用产权理论对中国古代土地制度进行分析可以发现,中国古代帝国社会中国家（君主）掌握的是土地产权结构中的所有权,社会成员拥有的是土地产权结构中的占有权和使用权,由此形成的一种具有高度残缺性特征的土地产权制度形态,阻碍了清晰的土地私有观念和土地私有制度的形成.因此,中国古代官僚制最基本的经济基础是全国范围内高度集中的土地所有权,而政治权力与土地所有权在国家层面上的高度统一使得君主成为一国之内最大的地主,官僚制体系主要是作为君主王权的代理者而存在,而能否控制官僚群体对社会的提取限度则成为维系帝国王朝政权存续的基本前提.

Interpretation of Chinese Ancient Bureaucratic Economic Base from the Perspective of Land Ownership——An Analysis Based on the New Institutional Economics

New Institutional Economics of property rights theory point out that property rights have incomplete and severability characteristics.Through these two characteristics of property rights in ancient China land system analysis,it can be found that Chinese ancient imperial political system was established,the formation of national（sovereign） to master the ownership structure of land ownership,and members of society have owns the land tenure and the land use rights of ownership structure.This is a highly incomplete character of the land property rights system morphology,and obstruct a clear idea of private ownership of land and land formation of the private system.Therefore,the most basic economic base of ancient Chinese bureaucratic system is the range of highly concentrated ownership of land,political power and land ownership at the national level so that the height of the monarchy to become a unified country＇s largest landowners.The bureaucratic system mainly exists as a royal agent,and the state can control the bureaucratic group extraction limit on society＇s basic premise is to maintain the survival of the regime of the imperial dynasty.