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区域协同立法博弈分析
引用本文:罗俊杰,易凌.区域协同立法博弈分析[J].时代法学,2009,7(2):45-49.
作者姓名:罗俊杰  易凌
作者单位:浙江万里学院法学院,浙江,宁波,35100
基金项目:国家社科基金,江浙沪社科规划联合招标 
摘    要:区域协同立法是适应区域经济一体化发展的立法体制创新。这一创新过程的实质是代表各利益主体的立法机关之间的复杂博弈,既有基于观念分歧的立法理念的“博弈”,也有基于利益冲突的策略型重复博弈。针对可能出现的博弈困境,应建立学习与交流机制以提升各方对区域协同立法的认知水平,并充分照顾到各方正当利益,以提高各方的协作意愿;应以促进区域市场有效运作为导向规范各行政区的立法行为,建立双边或多边协商机制,逐步提升协同立法的水平。

关 键 词:区域公共问题  协同立法  博弈困境  破解

A Game Theory Analysis of the Joint Legislation in a Region
LUO Jun-jie,YI Ling.A Game Theory Analysis of the Joint Legislation in a Region[J].Presentday Law Science,2009,7(2):45-49.
Authors:LUO Jun-jie  YI Ling
Institution:Law School;Zhejiang Wanli University;Ningbo;Zhejiang 315100;China
Abstract:The joint legislation in a region is an innovation of legislative system that fit to the jointly development of regional economy.The essence of the innovation is a complex game between legislative institutions on behalf of their administrative division,including the game of legislative ideal based on concept differences,and the tactically repeatitive game based on the benefit confliction.Game plights may be occur.In order to enhance their cooperative desire,we must constract learning and communicational sys...
Keywords:common regional problem  joint legislation  game plight  solving way  
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