Similar Facts in Civil Cases

This essay evaluates the recent restatement in O’Brienv Chief Constable of South Wales Police of the law on similarfacts in civil proceedings. The two-stage approach propoundedin O’Brien contains a number of conceptual problems. Apparentsimplicity was achieved by avoiding fundamental issues underlyingthis area. Prior to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, judges recognizedthat the common law similar facts rule had a role to play inboth civil and criminal trials; but they gave the rule a widerexclusionary scope in criminal than in civil cases. Adoptionof a moral perspective helps to explain this state of affairs.The rule, so it will be argued, protects the legitimacy of trialdeliberation by forbidding reliance on an assumption that disrespectsthe moral autonomy of the person whose conduct is being judged.This moral objection can arise in civil cases; but it arisesmore frequently and usually with greater force in criminal proceedings.Hence, while there is a need to reserve some judicial powerto disallow proof of similar incidents in the civil context,there is usually less reason for the exercise of that powerin civil cases than at criminal trials.