Negotiating the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects

Since 1951 a Danish-American defense agreement on Greenland has regulated US military activities there. The article gives a detailed empirical-theoretical analysis of the negotiation of the Agreement under five perspectives: bargaining power, agenda setting, negotiating positions, strategies and outcomes. An important parameter was the fact that negotiations took place in a cooperative setting with a long shadow of the future. This made for a skewed, though regular negotiation process with a give-and-take of positions, counter-positions and concessions. Negotiating strategies varied, with the US side concentrating on an "authority" strategy, while the Danes relied on a mixture of off-setting "moral" and "tied hands" strategies. Although the US got the best outcome, it was not a dictate, because the ground was leveled by the negotiations taking place as part of the build-up of a long-term security relationship and the fact that the United States was the demandeur vis-à-vis Denmark.