Theoretical Disagreement,Legal Positivism,and Interpretation |
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| Authors: | Dennis Patterson |
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| Institution: | 1. Rutgers University, Camden, NJ 08102, USA;2. Surrey Law School, Guildford, UKBoard of Governors Professor of Law and Philosophy, Rutgers University;3. Professor of Legal Philosophy, Surrey University, UK. My thanks to Raquel Barradas de Freitas, Richard Bellamy, Cecilie Eriksen, and Bosko Tripkovic for helpful comments on a draft of this article. |
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| Abstract: | Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article. |
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