政府部门谋位型腐败的经济学分析

分析了我国政府部门由职务变动引发的腐败问题。在我国市场经济尚未完全建立的现状之下,含有经济租金的一些政府部门职位成为一些人追逐的目标,加上目前我国政府部门的晋升制度还不够完善、政府组织的职位派生能力有限、政府组织与官员个人在实际工作能力和工作绩效方面存在着信息不对称、在补偿机制方面政府职位与经济福利待遇联系紧密等,为以谋取政府职务为目标的腐败行为提供了条件。谋位型腐败同时还成为引发谋利型腐败的一个重要根源。采用经济学研究方法,将谋位型腐败与谋利型腐败糅合在一个模型中加以分析,得出了如下一些结论:谋位型腐败发生的概率与参与同一职位竞争的人数负相关;工作能力弱的备选人相对于工作能力强的备选人更加倾向于采用行贿的手段谋取职务晋升;在两个备选人的工作能力和绩效相当的情况下,谋位型腐败发生的概率上升;谋位者个人、特别是握有人事安排决策权的部门负责人的腐败倾向性是谋位型腐败发生的关键因素;不同职位之间的经济收入差距越大,越易引发谋位型腐败。根据上述结论,提出了相应的政策建议。

An Economic Analysis of Position-seeking Corruption in Government Agencies

This paper analyzes position-seeking corruption caused by position changes in China's government agencies. At the moment when market economy is yet to be constructed and improved in China,those government positions containing economic rents become rent seekers' targets. Due to the imperfect promotion rules in government agencies, the naturally limited position creation ability of government agencies, the information imbalance in personal ability and work performance between government and its servants, and the present compensation system actually combining promotion with incomes,the probability of position-seeking corruption in government agencies is much raised. Position-seeking corruption is also one of the major factors that start rent seeking corruption. By use of the economic approach, this paper mainly works on position -seeking corruption as well as succeeds in analyzing rent seeking corruption in the same model. The model shows that there exists a negative correlation between the occurrence probability of position-seeking corruption and the number of position seekers. It also indicates that the position seeker with less ability is more likely to resort to bribery for promotion,and that the probability of position-seeking corruption rises when two position seekers are equal in personal capility and performance. Personal corruption propensity,especially which of those are in charge of personnel arrangements,is a key factor in position-seeking corruption. Finally,the large income gap among positions increases position seeking corruption. Relevant policy suggestions are offered at the end of the paper.