感情法益:谱系考察、方法论审视及本土化检验

感情法益自19世纪末的谱系演变表明,援用哲学、心理学的既有成果尝试定义感情,或立足于法益论的基本立场预设可被保护的感情类别,并非妥当的方法论路径。基于感情背后是否存有可回溯至宪法的基本权利这一立场转换,"不真正/真正感情保护犯"的二元筛查架构当为可行的思路。据此,"何种感情值得刑法保护"不应是一个预先判断的命题,感情应为个人或社会法益亦非是一个前置性论断。死者虔敬感这一既往被认为具有社会属性的感情法益可被证伪,其实质在于公民生前人格权的辐射保护;英雄烈士所承载的社会集体感情虽为共同价值观之表征,但在我国刑法第299条之一中仅作为依附于逝者人格权的罪责增量。安全感法益本身亦与社会秩序无涉,而是经公民的意思形成自由之受益权功能最终到达国家保护义务。

Emotion's Legal Interest: Genealogical Investigation,Preliminary Methodological Screening and Localization Test

As demonstrated by the genealogical development of emotion’s legal interest since the end of 19 th century,it is not a proper methodology to use the existing terms of philosophy and psychology to define,or to presuppose the types of emotions that shall be protected from the perspective of the Legal Interest Theory.The feasible methodology is a dual screening framework of"unreal/real emotion protection crimes,"by shifting the perspective to the question of whether there are any constitutional fundamental rights involved in the emotion to be protected.Accordingly,"what kind of emotion is worthy of criminal law’s protection"should not be a presupposition,and there is no such pre-judgement either that the emotion to be protected shall concern personal or social legal interest.For instance,the reverence for the deceased,which was considered to have social legal interest,can be falsified.In essence,it is the continuing protection of citizens’personality rights in their lifetimes.Also,the collective social sentiment attached to heroes and martyrs,as shown in one paragraph of Article 299 of the Criminal Law of PRC,though a symbol of common value,is merely an increment of guilt and liability attached to the deceased’s personality rights.In addition,the sense of security itself has nothing to do with social order,but under the will of the citizens fulfills the function guaranteeing the benefit of freedom,and ultimately becomes the state’s obligation for its protection.