荣誉权——一个巴别塔式的谬误?——“Right to Honour”的比较法考察

《民法通则》关于荣誉权的规定受1961年《苏联民事立法纲要》第7条的影响。但从作为人格权理论源头的罗马法的actio iniuriarum,到对人格利益保护持不同态度的法国法和德国法,以及深受德国法影响的前苏联法,均将honour作为人的主观自我认知。Honour强调了人在自我认知上的差异性。在当代,honour这种差异性人格利益逐渐让位于强调平等性的人格尊严(dignity)。在大陆法系法律语言环境中,honour从不是以"荣誉称号"为内容的人格利益,《民法通则》关于荣誉权的规定缺乏比较法基础。

Is the Right to Title of Honour in Chinese Law a Babel Tower Story? A Comparative Research

Article 102 of the Generarl Principles of the Civil law, was influenced by the Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics of 1961. Nonetheless, the definition of honour in the Article 7 of the Principles refers to the valuation of a person from the social view, as well as the self - esteem by the individual person, having nothing to do with title of honour. In the action iniuriarum of Roman law, which is the original source of personality rights in the civil law countries, honour is considered as self - esteem, protected by the interest of dignitas. In the European Middle Ages, the interest of honour was paid much attention due to the extreme importance of social status. After the codification of civil law, both French law, which accepted the main principles of action iniuriarum, and the German law, which refused to protect personality interests without physical damage through civil law channels, define honour as individual＇s self esteem. In Germany, the subjective interest of honour was replaced by the objective interest of human dignity, which was justified by the respect of human dignity and freedom of development for all and without any difference. The right to honour in the civil law system is never the interest of title.