自始不能责任的学理建构

自始不能责任渊源于罗马法上的杰尔苏规则,对其的正确理解应当是仅排除债权人的实际履行请求权,而不是整个合同一起归为无效,这就意味着应当向债权人赔偿积极利益。自始客观不能与自始主观不能在目的上并不存在根本不同,因此应当为二者规定相同的法律效果。自始不能与嗣后不能在准据时点上存在着偶然性,因此同样应当为二者建立相同的责任后果。为此,应当以债务人不履行给付允诺解决传统框架下体系违反与学理不规则的问题。立法与学理应当通过互动而实现统一,单纯地突出学理的服务功能并不妥当。

Theoretical Construction for the Liability of Initial Impossibility

The liability of initial impossibility originates in Celsus-Regel in Roman law, which should be properly understood as the elimination of obligee's claim for specific performance, rather than the invali- dation of the whole contract, thus the positive interests of the obligee shall be compensated. There isn't substantial difference between the aim of initial subjective impossibility and that of initial objective impos- sibility, so the liabilities of these two kinds should be unified, i.e. providing same legal effect for the two situations. The happening of initial impossibility or subsequent impossibility depends on the occasionality of their judging time point, so they should assume same liability too. Thus, we should take the obligor' s nonperformance of their promises as the base to solve the systematic wrong and theoretical irregularities in the traditional structure.