A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism

The concept of legal pluralism has been touted by many socio-legal scholars as a key concept in the analysis of law. Yet, after almost twenty years of such claims, there has been little progress in the development of the concept. This article will argue that the underlying cause of this lack progress lies in the fact that promoters of the concept have relied upon function-based, essentialist concepts of law. It will describe the problems generated by such concepts and, following this general analysis, will review the versions of legal pluralism articulated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Gunther Teubner. The critique of their versions of legal pluralism will lead into the posing of a non-essentialist alternative which avoids the conceptual problems of prevailing versions of legal pluralism, and provides a better tool for purposes of research and analysis of the relationship between law and society.