主动“加码”:基层政策执行新视角--基于H省J县的村干部选举案例研究

基层政府如何执行存在"张力"的政策?既有研究关注到基层政府在"压力型体制"下通过"变通"、"共谋"等非正式运作执行被上级"加码"的政策。由于"加码"导致既有政策"张力"的增加,作为权力末梢的基层对于"加码"避之不及。吊诡的是,基层时常主动"加码"存在"张力"的政策。如何解释基层主动"制造困难"?本研究以H省J县的村干部选举为案例,揭示基层政府主动"加码"存在"张力"政策的逻辑:主动"加码"被认为是下级向上级"讨价还价"的重要方式,这基于主动"加码"符合上级对完成任务以及晋升的渴求,当基层官员执行存在"张力"的政策时,主动"加码"能够规避政策执行中的潜在风险。简言之,主动"加码"有利于基层官员"卸责"。这对既有研究提供了新的补充:对于存在"张力"的政策,基层政府通过主动"加码"可能更好地完成任务。

Intentionally Added Workload (jia ma):A New Dimension of Policy Implementation of Local Government--A Case Study of Village Cadres Election in J County of H Province

How policies could be implemented under tension between authoritative system and effective governance in local government levels? Previous studies noticed that these increasingly expanded policies have being implemented informally and flexibly through"transformation"or"collusion"by local officials. As policy content expanded, local official’s pressures were increased. Therefore they should rely on informal approach to reduce difficulties in policy implementation. In a word,local officials should prefer to avoid expanding of policies. But they often intentionally increase their workload in fact. How should we explain their intentions? Taking the village cadres election in J county of H province as a case, the study reveals their logic of action: intentionally increased workload in policy implementation is considered as an important counterweight for the grassroots officials in bargaining with their superiors who are wishful for promotion through the policy accomplishment. Overloaded works of local officials can reduce the potential risks and political responsibilities in policy implementation. This study provides new evidence that policies can be accomplished better and flexibly by local officials through intentionally increased workload.