Ethics,Justice, and Suffering in the Thought of Levinas: The Problem of the Passage

Emmanuel Levinas is the philosopherof suffering as such: a suffering withoutregard for its causes and justifications thatis manifested to the I in its encounter,``beyond being', with the face of the Other. ``Ethics as first philosophy', however,subsequently passes over to justice in Levinas'thought, and this means that it passes througha violence that is very much in being. The movement from ethics to justice revealswhat this essay calls ``the problem of thepassage'. Using the thought of Levinas as itspoint of departure, the essay attempts touncover this problem in all of its profundity. A characteristic of all thinking in the Westernphilosophical tradition, the passage fromA to B is best understood as a mode ofthinking that clings to the passage assuch – in the form of ``A B' – as itsown special way of persisting in being. At thesame time, however, this means that ethicscannot support or comfort justice withoutdevouring itself, which is to say the self that both ethics and justice seem torequire.