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论美国公司法中的压榨行为处理机制
引用本文:娄丙录,史恒志.论美国公司法中的压榨行为处理机制[J].河南省政法管理干部学院学报,2007,22(2):156-161.
作者姓名:娄丙录  史恒志
作者单位:河南大学,法学院,河南,开封,475001
摘    要:因少数股股东退出机制短缺、资本多数决原则、合同预先规定的不足及法院遵循商业判断规则等原因,导致美国闭锁公司的少数股股东极易受到控制股东的压榨,为此,美国公司法为受压榨的股东设计了一套救济措施。考察美国的压榨行为处理机制,无疑会对我国公司法日后的完善有所裨益。

关 键 词:控制股东  少数股股东  压榨行为  买断请求权
文章编号:1008-6951(2007)02-0156-06
修稿时间:2006年9月17日

On the Disposal of Oppressive Actions in the Corporate Law of US
Lou Binglu,Shi Hengzhi.On the Disposal of Oppressive Actions in the Corporate Law of US[J].Journal of Henan Administrative Institute of Politics and Law,2007,22(2):156-161.
Authors:Lou Binglu  Shi Hengzhi
Abstract:The lack of exit machanism for the minority,the norm of majority rule,the absence of advance planning in contracts and the deference of the business judgment rule by courts form the reason why the minority shareholders in close corporations are vulnerable to oppressive majority actions since the minority,as a consequence,American corporate law provides a set of remedies for the oppressive shareholders.It is helpful to our corporate law without doubt to focus on the disposal of oppressive actions in America.
Keywords:controlling shareholders  minority shareholders  oppression  buyout remedy
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