| Abstract: | The traditional view of economists has been that correctivetaxes are superior to direct regulation of harmful externalitieswhen the state's information about control costs is incomplete.In recent years, however, many economists seem to have adopteda different view—that either corrective taxes or quantityregulation could be superior to the other. We emphasize thatone argument for this newer view, identified with Weitzman (1974),holds only if the state is constrained to use a fixed tax rate(a linear tax schedule) even when harm is nonlinear. But if—asseems more plausible—the state can impose a nonlineartax equal to the schedule of harm or can adjust the tax rateupon learning that it diverges from marginal harm, then correctivetaxes are superior to quantity regulation. Another argumentfavoring quantity regulation is that it gains appeal when thestate is uncertain about the harm caused by an externality.In this case, however, a corrective tax schedule (equal to theexpected harm schedule) is superior to quantity regulation. |
