资本约束制度的进化和机制设计——以中美公司法的比较为核心

我国学者常常将美国公司法上的资本制度称之为授权资本制,并将其与大陆法相对,作为物种多元的样本,同时也作为比较法研究的时候,进行理论折中的一端。本文从进化的角度揭示出,在其他国家历史上也存在着和我国、大陆国家类似的法定资本制度,但随着社会生活的发展和法律规制技术,乃至于法律理论和理念的变化,这些僵化而无效的制度被不断的扬弃,而代之以宽松的资本规制+趋严的诚信义务(fidu-ciaryduty)的方式。具体表现为:(1)从政府通过法律强行性规范直接限制,进化到股东、公司、董事和债权人之间的相互制约;(2)从注重公司资本的起点,进化到以破产为核心标准来进行规制;(3)从公司和股东之间的不当交易及其方式的事前限制,进化到对诚信义务的事后责任分配。

The Development of Capital Constraining Mechanism and its Design

Legal and authorized capital system was deemed as a distinction between the Continental and the Common corporate capital institution in most existed studies among Chinese scholars. This paper tried to re-oriented the vision from a diversified one to evolutionary one. Legal capital system was an old-fashioned, useless regulation based on the fund trust theory in history, and was given up with the evolution of world-wide corporation law for it’s ineffectiveness and lack of efficiency. After exploring the process of evolution of legal capital, capital maintenance rules in U. S. corporate legal regimes, the paper criticized the current revision of Chinese mandatory rules.