Judicial Independence, Judicial Promotion and the Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers—An Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court

This paper investigates the Landes-Posner thesis on judicial independence using data on public law decisions in which the government was the defendant decided in the New Zealand High Court over the period 1958–2001. We use survival analysis to examine whether successive New Zealand governments have promoted judges from the High Court to the Court of Appeal (which stands above the High Court) on the basis of political considerations, the quality of the judge's decision-making or both. Our findings suggest that the quality of decision-making has generally been important. Consistent with the weak form of the Landes-Posner hypothesis we find no evidence that governments have used their powers to punish judges who decided cases against them. On the contrary, we find some support for the strong form of the Landes-Posner thesis that governments positively use their powers to secure judicial independence.