| Abstract: | Since the late 1990s, a large number of electoral reforms have occurred in China's towns and townships across the country. While scattered cases of direct election of township heads happened in the early years, recent cases have acquired very diverse and complicated institutional arrangements. Three ideal types of innovation have emerged that range from competitive selection to direct election. The actual changes to electing or selecting a township leader can be best measured in (1) the degree to which public participation is expanded; and (2) the degree of competition introduced between candidates. In the late 1990s, during the first wave of these innovations, the enterprising cadres in the regime's middle elite, mostly county and city officials, often played a critical ‘crafting’ role, as they responded to local crises in governance or competed for faster promotion. In recent years, amelioration in local governance means crises have become less pressing, while the widespread implementation of reforms means that contained forms of participation and competition are likely to become the new status quo of township institutions. |
