| Abstract: | In Res. 1373 (2001), the Security Council laid down the dutyto bring terrorists to justice and to deny them safe haven.Whereas such duty expressed a clear political imperative inthe aftermath of 11 September 2001, it is less clear how nationalauthorities are supposed to translate it into a set of enforceablelegal obligations. If it is interpreted as ‘obliging’states to prosecute and try terrorists, as the Security CouncilCounter Terrorism Committee seems to suggest, the power of prosecutorsto decide whether or not to bring a case to court may be severelyimpaired. An unconditional obligation to bring terrorists tocourt would not necessarily strengthen states’ judicialresponse to the threat of international terrorism. A sensibleexercise of prosecutorial discretion may be instrumental inarticulating a flexible and more effective response in variouscircumstances. Moreover, a rigid interpretation of the requirementto bring terrorists to justice does not find support in SecurityCouncil and General Assembly resolutions on terrorism. Far frommandating that alleged offenders be unconditionally broughtto trial, the universal counter-terrorism conventions and protocolslimit themselves to requiring that the jurisdiction of nationalcourts be established, which is conceptually different fromimposing its actual exercise. |
